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Stephen Nadler recently remarked that we are in the midst of a Spinoza revival.1 If 
Michael Mack is to be believed, based on the strong case presented in this ambitious 
and valuable book, this revival has been going on since the mid-eighteenth century. It 
is evident in the thought of writers promoting a universality that preserves 
particularity, diversity, equality and inclusivity, based on the interdependence of 
beings rather than their hierarchy. Mack’s contention is that this cluster of ideas starts 
with Spinoza and is carried through a “hidden Enlightenment” of thinkers including 
Herder, Goethe, Franz Rosenzweig, George Eliot, and Sigmund Freud. Mack 
impressively researches the interconnections between these thinkers, tracing their 
ideas back to Spinoza’s and building a trajectory of thinking that reaches into the 
present day. 
 
Mack is compelled by this alternative Enlightenment thinking and the implications it 
has for theory and practice today. He suggests that the ideals of the “traditional” 
Enlightenment – the power of reason, the acquisition of universal concepts, the 
exaltation of freedom and faith in progress – lead to destructive tendencies in and 
between individuals and cultures. In order to live more sustainably, he argues, we 
should adopt “Spinoza’s vision of a non-hierarchical modernity” (4), which rejects 
anthropocentrism and teleology for a doctrine of our interconnectedness with one 
another and the rest of nature. 
 
This is an important, original, and worthwhile project. The criticism of Enlightenment 
values is a common theme in modern and postmodern writing. But rather than 
embrace the quasi-nihilism of some postmodern positions – which would have us 
replace reason, universality and progress with uncertainty, instability, and rupture – 
Mack asserts that we need different versions of the Enlightenment ideas we oppose. 
He shows how Spinoza’s philosophy departs from prevailing doctrines of Cartesian 
science, Christian theology, and Kantian rationality, and indicates how Spinoza’s 
positive programme might ground non-hierarchical ways of thinking about selfhood, 
nationality, and history. Eliot and Freud, Mack argues in two particularly strong 
chapters, develop just these ideas in their texts. The range and depth of Mack’s 
research, across philosophical, literary, and theological sources, is extremely 
impressive, as is his ability to bring this material together to serve his core argument. 
 
Unfortunately, in his critique of traditional Enlightenment thinking, Mack commits 
two fallacies typical of this genre. The first is to assume that epistemological positions 
lead necessarily to socio-political outcomes. For example, Mack claims that in 
questioning Cartesian dualism, Spinoza “undermined the societal force of various 
ideologies that have their foundation in specific epistemological assumptions” (23). 
The ideologies in question are, we gather, those that exalt intellectual pursuits above 
bodily activities, thereby valuing certain kinds of people over others. Yet the 
Cartesian position does not necessitate those ideologies, any more than the Spinozist 
position necessarily overcomes them. It is possible to criticize Descartes’ hierarchy of 
mind over body and to hold sexist, racist, or elitist views, just as it is possible to 
affirm Descartes’ epistemology without subscribing to those views. Similarly, belief 
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in teleology does not commit a thinker to the “moral and intellectual superiority” of 
one group over another (43). Herder himself is evidence that a teleological viewpoint 
need not be an elitist one. Yet one of the book’s main premises is the assumption that 
teleology leads directly and unavoidably to the division of human communities, 
inequality, hierarchy, and even violence. This is a dangerous assumption, because it 
suggests that rejecting teleology is enough to indicate our opposition to historically 
ingrained forms of exclusion. But it isn’t enough, because there is no necessary 
connection between the two.  
 
The second fallacy is the assumption that any thinker holds the single set of views 
ascribed to “traditional Enlightenment thinking”. The bogeyman here, as in so many 
cases, is Kant. Ignoring the complexity of his thought, the book presents a Kant 
obsessed with the unhindered march of reason through science, morality, and history. 
This caricature leads Mack to make some invalid claims, such as that “Kant cannot 
accept that sense impression precedes the conception of ideas” (49) and that he sought 
to “establish an a priori system that is not limited by epistemological constraints” 
(132). (Both these claims are falsified by the first page of the Critique of Pure 
Reason.) No credence is given to the non-hierarchical aspects of Kant’s thought: his 
arguments for moral equality, autonomy, and human freedom (areas in which, Kant 
claimed, the Spinozists could not deliver). 
 
Worse, Kant’s philosophy of history is presented as aiming for “an unlimited state of 
reason” (132) that does away with diversity, irrationality and imperfection. In fact, 
Kant’s essays on human development and diversity are rich works that defy this 
broad-brush criticism. What is objectionable in these works – particularly Kant’s 
racist view that skin colour is linked to rational capacity – needs to be carefully 
explained and assessed. Kant does not claim that non-whites are irrational or that they 
should not exist, as Mack accuses. Rather, Kant claims that each race has a fixed 
capacity for rational activity, and that these differences are necessary if all the goals 
of human reason are ultimately to be achieved. The latter is by no means a certainty, 
but an assumption that, Kant argues, our limited state of knowledge requires us to 
make. It would have been advisable for Mack to engage with the detail and 
complexity of this material, not least because it would make clearer the opposing 
position taken by Herder. 
 
J. G. Herder, the subject of four of the nine chapters of the book, is the centre of 
Mack’s study. Herder is a neglected figure in the history of philosophy who deserves 
more prominence given the contemporary relevance of his thought. An advocate of 
cultural pluralism, ethnic diversity, and the multiplicity of historical narratives, and an 
opponent of colonialism, cultural superiority, and environmental degradation, perhaps 
Herder is finally due a revival of his own. Mack makes the case passionately for 
Herder’s recognition as a significant contributor to modernity, while demonstrating 
that his thinking is grounded in Spinoza’s philosophy. Though Herder’s thought has 
been better explained elsewhere,2 Mack impressively draws together much secondary 
literature to make a powerful case for Herder’s enduring relevance. 
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These chapters celebrate rather than critically assess Herder’s contributions. The 
result is a largely unquestioning affirmation of Herder’s rightness, both theoretical 
and socio-political. For instance, Mack states that Herder’s cultural diversity 
“questions the value of monolithic and absolute ideas” (77). But might not “cultural 
diversity” itself be in danger of becoming an absolute idea? And what about the 
absolute status of the idea of organic force, Herder’s explanandum for the form of the 
universe? More problematically, Mack insists – in accordance with his view that such 
positions are necessarily progressive ones – that Herder is anti-teleological and anti-
anthropocentric, whereas Herder’s texts suggest the opposite. It is true that Herder 
denies a single linear progression and that he has “no notion of improvement through 
development” (104), but Herder does argue that the universe is directed by organic 
force towards a goal wherein all human capacities will be realized (Humanität). Mack 
does not adequately respond to the contention that Herder does hold teleological and 
anthropocentric views, nor to Kant’s point that there is an irresolvable discrepancy 
between Herder’s teleology and his naturalism. 
 
I similarly felt that Mack needed to do more to convince us that Spinoza is a non-
hierarchical thinker. Mack suggests that Spinoza aims “to do away with privilege and 
other forms of hierarchical rankings” (6). This claim is never really justified, and it 
does not take into account what we might call the Nietzschean reading of Spinoza. If 
Spinoza’s universe is interpreted in terms of the differing powers of things, it is hard 
to escape the conclusion that things that are more powerful are also more virtuous, 
more rational, and more free – in short, not equal to but better than those things that 
are less powerful. It is not obvious that Spinoza really does “break down the 
hierarchical divide between those who succeed and those who fail” (7) rather than 
reinforcing it. It is a shame that beyond a brief footnote (37), Mack does not address 
this interesting question. 
 
Finally, I must note that Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity is full of 
typographical errors. This would not be worth mentioning except that it seems 
indicative of a certain haste in the book’s preparation. Mack’s wide-ranging and 
interdisciplinary research, along with the sheer plurality of ideas he wants to convey, 
means that the text frequently changes direction and focus. This makes for difficult 
reading. Many points needed better contextualization and a longer, more sustained 
treatment. It is because Mack’s position is so interesting and original that the reader 
longs for a slower, more drawn-out explanation and assessment. The services of an 
editor would have been beneficial, as would a proper conclusion and bibliography. 
 
Despite its problems, Spinoza and the Specters of Modernity is a compelling text 
whose core idea is well conceived and researched. Its distinctive approach is to draw 
intriguing new connections between thinkers not usually treated together, and to show 
the relevance of these connections for contemporary thought. This book is well worth 
seeking out. Mack has assured Spinoza’s place at the heart of an alternative history of 
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